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INTRODUCTION
Professor Nancy Scherer has offered a proposal to maximize diversity
and legitimacy in the federal judiciary, a profound enigma that vexes
judicial selection.1 This is important because the selection process involves
the very core of law and politics:2 the President chooses nominees whom
the Senate approves; once confirmed, these judges resolve controversial
political issues.3 Scherer proceeds by first examining rationales for and
against a court-appointment strategy that would enhance diversity. She
observes that both champions and critics of diversity share the goal of
increased judicial legitimacy, although they obviously differ on how best to
achieve it. Scherer then suggests a new solution, predicated on this common
ground, to resolve the disagreement—urging diversity advocates to
articulate the concrete benefits that expanding diversity can afford
majorities and to collect and synthesize empirical information confirming
these advantages.
This Essay descriptively and critically reviews Scherer’s article.
Although her account provides valuable insights into increasing diversity
and legitimacy, it understates the crucial influence of politics. Indeed, the
growing politicization of the selection process, which implicates the debate
over diversity, could seriously undermine judicial legitimacy. However,
President Barack Obama’s approach to judicial appointments elucidates the
issue and could point the way forward. This Essay thus scrutinizes Obama’s
judicial selection effort, which confirms many ideas that Scherer espouses
while showing how political deficiencies in the modern selection process
erode diversity and legitimacy, and perhaps Scherer’s provocative solution.
This response ultimately discusses some promising measures beyond
Scherer’s recommendation that could enhance diversity and legitimacy in
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1
Nancy Scherer, Diversifying the Federal Bench: Is Universal Legitimacy for the U.S. Justice
System Possible?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 587 (2011) (link).
2
Id. at 587.
3
Id.; see also Neil A. Lewis, Move to Limit Clinton’s Judicial Choices Fails, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
1997,
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/30/us/move-to-limit-clinton-s-judicial-choices-fails.html
(discussing attempts by senators to increase their influence in the federal appeals court appointment
process because these courts are “more influential in shaping the law”) (link).
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light of the threat that politicization poses.
I. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Scherer illuminates the puzzle at the heart of judicial selection, a
process that involves each branch of government. In exploring how to
improve diversity and legitimacy, Scherer initially evaluates the possible
benefits of a diversification strategy. This strategy could remedy
discrimination, which historically restricted the number of minority, female,
and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered (LGBT) judges;4 afford
“descriptive representation,” so that courts better mirror the nation’s
demographics;5 and directly promote “substantive representation” by
offering different perspectives on contested legal questions.6 Scherer then
examines the challenges inherent in an effort to diversify the judiciary. The
diversification strategy is said to have a detrimental impact on persons of
color and women,7 yield judges who may seem less qualified,8 and generate
reverse discrimination that results in stronger white males being passed
over for judicial appointments, fueling backlash.9
Scherer finds that both champions and opponents of judicial diversity
claim that their strategy best advances legitimacy,10 but she concludes that
neither group actually wins the debate.11 Scherer then considers other
strategies that may be more successful. She implores supporters of
diversification to enunciate the advantages that additional diversity could
provide the majority, focusing on the nuanced relationship among
diversification, crime, and legitimacy.12 Scherer hypothesizes that
expanding diversity will improve perceptions of legitimacy by reducing
4
Scherer, supra note 1, at 592–97. Scherer defines diversity as racial, ethnic, and gender difference,
which encompasses African Americans, Hispanics and women, but she does not include LGBT
individuals. See id. “Minority” means nonmajority ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation here.
5
Id. at 597–604; see Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 91 CALIF. L.
REV. 1109, 1117 (2003) (link); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics
on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L.J. 1423, 1442 (2008) (link).
6
Scherer, supra note 1, at 604–10; see Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive (but Worthwhile) Quest for a
Diverse Bench in the New Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597, 610–17 (2003) (link); Carl W.
Tobias, Postpartisan Federal Judicial Selection, 51 B.C. L. REV 769, 788 (2010) (link).
7
Scherer, supra note 1, at 615–18; George F. Will, The Unintended Consequences of Racial
Preferences, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-unintendedconsequences-of-racial-preferences/2011/11/29/gIQAbuoPEO_story.html (link).
8
Scherer, supra note 1, at 618–21; Charlie Savage, Ratings Shrink President’s List for Judgeships,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/us/politics/screening-panel-rejectsmany-obama-picks-for-federal-judgeships.html?pagewanted=all (link).
9
These arguments echo contentions against affirmative action. Scherer, supra note 1, at 591, 620–
24.
10
Id. at 591, 625–30; see supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text.
11
Scherer, supra note 1, at 591.
12
Id. at 631–32; see Carl Tobias, Diversity and the Federal Bench, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1197,
1205–06 (2010) (link).
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crime and cultivating a law-abiding society, thus presenting minorities and
majorities with numerous benefits, as each are clear stakeholders in
diversity.13 Acknowledging that her premise remains a theory, she
encourages legal academics, political scientists, court interest groups, and
politicians to empirically validate the gains that this strategy could offer.14
II. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Scherer pinpoints a real conundrum: how to improve both diversity and
legitimacy in the federal court system. She recognizes that both proponents
and critics of diversification pursue strategies intended to increase
legitimacy, and Scherer believes that this common ground would rectify
disagreements regarding diversity. She thus calls on advocates to show how
expanded diversity realizes improved legitimacy.
However, certain questions receive either minimal assessment or none
at all. Scherer only nominally examines President Obama’s judicial
selection initiative, which supplies empirical data on minority and female
candidates as well as a number of tools for enlarging diversity. A related
critical matter, also lacking full analysis, is the politics-driven selection
process that has dramatically worsened during the Obama Administration.
Since Judge Robert Bork’s failed Supreme Court nomination in 1987,
charges, recriminations, paybacks, and sustained partisanship have corroded
the appointments process, seriously undercutting legitimacy and directly
expanding the influence of politics, especially with respect to the role of
diversity. These counterproductive dynamics bear greater responsibility for
the putative subversion of legitimacy than stigmatization, less qualified
designees, and reverse discrimination, all of which critics wrongly assign to
diversification, capitalizing on it to enhance their political authority.
Scherer’s remedy is not clearly the sole or most efficacious approach to
diversification, which she candidly admits by characterizing her premise as
a hypothesis and calling for greater empirical verification. Perhaps
legitimacy could fail to justify diversification, advantages would resist
quantification, or further study would yield insufficient data to convince
opponents. Thus, selection participants might want to adopt her creative
solution and other promising concepts, while tolerating differences
regarding diversity.
In short, Scherer’s article does much to strengthen one’s appreciation
13
Scherer explains that presidential “use of a diversity strategy to raise legitimacy among minorities
could instill greater obedience to the law among the people statistically most at risk to disobey it
(minority men) [and should concomitantly] alleviate whites’ concerns about the crime problem in this
country—a tangible benefit for whites.” Scherer, supra note 1, at 633; see STEPHEN PINKER, THE
BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE (2011); see also Charles Lane, Taking a Bite Out of Crime, WASH.
POST,
Dec.
26,
2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/taking-a-bite-out-ofcrime/2011/12/22/gIQAa0LTJP_story.html (noting that decreased crime rates in the US has led to
psychological, political, and economic payoffs for the country) (link).
14
Scherer, supra note 1, at 633.
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for court appointments, diversification, legitimacy, and ways to resolve the
dilemma, but individual facets of her proposal warrant a more critical
examination. Scherer understates how much bitter partisanship in the
confirmation process erodes court legitimacy and thus her prescription may
not maximize diversity and legitimacy as long as such rampant partisanship
exists.
III. IMPROVING SELECTION
Scherer astutely recognizes “interbranch conflicts over nominations
date” back to our nation’s founding,15 but the process worsened
substantially after Judge Robert Bork’s failed Supreme Court nomination.16
Allegations, countercharges, paybacks, and divisiveness have since plagued
the process when the party lacking White House control delayed and even
obstructed selection. The GOP employed “pocket vetoes” to stymie
minority and female nominee confirmations across much of President Bill
Clinton’s tenure,17 and Democrats relied on filibusters in stalling many of
President George W. Bush’s picks.18 This Section examines President
Obama’s effective efforts to improve diversity and legitimacy by
nominating many well-qualified, minority and female candidates, although
mounting politicization limited his ability to swiftly fill vacancies with
excellent minority and female judges, a phenomenon exacerbated during his
Administration.
A. Obama’s Judicial Selection
Obama depended on a sizeable White House Counsel’s office19 and

15

Id. at 587; see also MICHAEL GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, at xvii (2003)
(“[T]he framers expected (even hoped) that conflicts would ensue from [the federal appointments
process] design.”).
16
See generally MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE (1992) (documenting Judge Bork’s
failed nomination process).
17
See Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Picking Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 265, 281–
88 (1999); Carl Tobias, Choosing Judges at the Close of the Clinton Administration, 52 RUTGERS L.
REV. 827, 828–29 (2000) (link).
18
See Press Release, White House, Office of Press Sec’y, President Bush Says Senate Filibuster
Decision
a
“Disgrace”
(Mar.
6,
2003),
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306.html (link); Emmet J. Bondurant, The Senate
Filibuster: The Politics of Obstruction, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 467, 477–79 (2011) (link); Gerard N.
Magliocca, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 303 (2011) (link). For more 1987–2008
analysis, see generally NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS (2005); AMY STEIGERWALT, BATTLE OVER
THE BENCH (2010).
19
See Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama’s Judiciary at Midterm, 94 JUDICATURE 262, 264 (2011);
Jeffrey
Toobin,
Bench
Press,
NEW
YORKER,
Sept.
21,
2009,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/21/090921fa_fact_toobin (link); Jon Ward, Obama Beefs
Up Legal Staff, WASH. TIMES, July 21, 2009, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/21/whitehouse-beefs-up-legal-staff/print/ (link).
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Vice President Joe Biden’s extensive Judiciary Committee experience20 in
his approach to judicial selection. The President also assumed major
responsibility for selecting circuit judges,21 and to a lesser extent for
selecting district judges, and had the Department of Justice (DOJ) prepare
nominees for Senate hearings and votes.22 He consulted Republican and
Democratic elected officials from states with vacancies before making
official nominations.23 Most officials have commissions that investigate and
forward a number of very qualified minorities and women to the politicians,
who concomitantly send them to President Obama for nomination.24
Obama has rigorously emphasized diversity.25 The President has
implemented many special initiatives to foster diversity that resulted in the
nomination of numerous minority and female prospects. He contacted
traditional sources like the American Bar Association (ABA),26 as well as
nonconventional sources like minority and women’s advocacy groups that
know skilled candidates. Obama has pursued salient aid from minority and
female lawmakers, who have identified capable candidates and helped them
navigate the appointment process. He has requested that selection
commissions and officers undertake concerted attempts to locate female and
minority candidates.27 Under this request, committees28 and legislators have
20

Keith Koffler, Biden Staff to Play Key Role in Sotomayor Confirmation, ROLLCALL, May 26,

2009.
21

They cover multiple states, have fewer, more critical openings, are courts of last resort in virtually
all cases, and treat controversial issues. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS (1996); Lewis,
supra note 3.
22
Goldman, supra note 19; Tobias, supra note 6, at 777. The Office of Legal Policy (OLP) leads.
23
GOP senators sent names. See Gary Martin, The Battle over Obama’s Federal Judges in Texas
Heats Up, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 8, 2009, http://blog.chron.com/txpotomac/2009/10/the-battle-overobamas-federal-judges-in-texas-heats-up/ (link).
24
See Tricia Bishop, City Judge Nominated for Court of Appeals, BALT. SUN, Apr. 3, 2009,
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-04-03/news/0904020105_1_district-court-court-of-appeals-davis
(link); Joe Ryan, President Barack Obama Nominates Federal Judge in Newark to U.S. Appeals Court,
N.J.
STAR-LEDGER,
June
19,
2009,
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/06/president_barack_obama_nominat.html (link); Carol J.
Williams, Obama Names Four New Federal Judges for California, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/09/local/me-judges9 (link).
25
Goldman et al., supra note 19, at 288; Tobias, supra note 12, at 1203–06. For President Obama’s
nominations that demonstrate his emphasis on diversity, see 111th Congress—Judicial Nominations,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.
ARCHIVES
(Aug.
2011),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/judicialnominations111.htm (link); 112th Congress—Judicial
Nominations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/olp/judicialnominations112.htm (last visited
Apr. 2, 2012) (link).
26
Obama reinstated ABA analysis before nominations; this helped to discover concerns, which
saved embarrassment and time. Terry Carter, Do-Over, A.B.A. J., May 2009, at 62 (link); Tobias, supra
note 6, at 777; Savage, supra note 8.
27
See Goldman et al., supra note 19, at 288; Tobias, supra note 12, at 1203.
28
For example, the Texas Federal Judicial Evaluation Committee sent five Latinos for Texas
Districts. See Press Release, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Sens. Hutchison, Cornyn Applaud Confirmation of
Marmolejo
to
Southern
District
Judgeship
(Oct.
3,
2011),
available
at
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searched for, reviewed, and proposed competent minorities and women for
nomination.29
Obama has cultivated, suggested, and confirmed a number of fine
minority and female persons; a substantial percentage of them are federal or
state court judges.30 His 181 nominees include 32 African Americans, 20
Latinos, 12 Asian Americans, 75 women, and 4 LGBT individuals.31 Obama
has even recommended minority and female candidates whom Republican
members support,32 including Republican appointees—notably Justice
Sonia Sotomayor—and considered many others with direct GOP links.33
The ABA awarded its highest ranking to four African American, three

http://www.hutchison.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=810 (discussing the recommendation and
confirmation of Marina Garcia Marmolejo) (link); Press Release, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Sens.
Hutchison, Cornyn Applaud Nomination of Guaderrama to Western District Judgeship (Sept. 15, 2011),
available at http://www.hutchison.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=778 (discussing recommendation
and nomination of David Campos Guaderrama) (link); Press Release, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Sens.
Hutchison, Cornyn on Senate Approval of Nelva Gonzales Ramos as Federal Judge (Aug. 3, 2011),
available at http://www.hutchison.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=732 (discussing confirmation of
Nelva Gonzales Ramos) (link); Press Release, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Sens. Cornyn, Hutchison
Recommend Costa & Guaderrama for the Federal Bench (Jul. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.hutchison.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=678 (discussing nomination of Gregg Costa)
(link); Press Release, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Texas Senators & Congressman Applaud Senate Approval
of Diana Saldana for Federal Judge in South Texas (Feb. 7, 2011), available at
http://hutchison.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=114 (discussing confirmation of Diana Saldana) (link);
111th Congress—Judicial Nominations, supra note 25; 112th Congress—Judicial Nominations, supra
note 25.
29
Officials from eleven states sent minority circuit court candidates whom senators later confirmed.
See, e.g., supra note 24; infra note 69.
30
See supra note 24. Senators have approved federal judges, who have accessible records and
undergo prompt ABA review. Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton
Administration, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 752 (1997) (link); Neil Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of
Judges Reagan Favored, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/10/us/bushpicking-the-kind-of-judges-reagan-favored.html?pagewanted=all (link).
31
ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL SELECTION SNAPSHOT 6 (2012) [hereinafter AFJ SNAPSHOT],
available at http://www.afj.org/judicial-selection/judicial-selection-snapshot.pdf (link); Chris Geidner,
Michael Fitzgerald, Approved on 91–6 Vote, Will Be First Out LBGT Federal Judge Outside New York,
METRO WEEKLY, Mar. 15, 2012, http://metroweekly.com/poliglot/2012/03/michael-fitzgeraldapproved-on.html#.T24CcYx1uNg.email (link). For data on the appointees of previous presidents, see
Sheldon Goldman, Obama and the Federal Judiciary: Great Expectations but Will He Have a
Dickens of a Time Living Up to Them?, 7 FORUM 1 (2009).
32
Home state GOP senators favored Judges Beverly Martin, Mary Murguia, and Jane Stranch. 156
CONG. REC. S17 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 2010) (link); id. at S10,986 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010) (link); id. at
S7009 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2010) (link).
33
Neil A. Lewis, After Delay, Senate Approves Judge for Court in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
1998,
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/03/nyregion/after-delay-senate-approves-judge-for-court-innew-york.html (link); see Carl Tobias, The Federal Appellate Court Appointments Conundrum, 2005
UTAH L. REV. 743, 770 (link); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Sotomayor, a Trail Blazer and a Dreamer, N.Y.
TIMES,
May
27,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/politics/27websotomayor.html?pagewanted=all (link).
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Latino, and two Asian American circuit nominees.34
During the nomination and confirmation processes, the Administration
cooperated with Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), the Judiciary Committee
chair; Senator Harry Reid (D-NV), the Majority Leader; and their
counterparts, Senators Jeff Sessions (R-AL) and Mitch McConnell (RKY).35 However, Sessions and many of his Republican colleagues found
certain minority nominees—such as Professor Goodwin Liu and Judges
Andre Davis, Edward Chen, and Bill Martinez—to be controversial, even
though they were considerably less liberal than some Bush appointees were
conservative. Sessions contended that Liu pursued a radical agenda—
invoking a “living Constitution” and “empathy-standard”36—and further
noted that Davis was “reversed quite a number of times,”37 and that Chen
and Martinez would not serve as “neutral umpires.”38 Senator Sessions
summarized: Obama’s nominees manifest a “common and concerning
DNA—the ACLU chromosome.”39
The Senate did not vote on any of Obama’s judicial nominees—some
of whom he nominated that spring—until September 2009. This was partly
because Sotomayor’s appointment consumed three months in which
negligible effort was devoted to lower court nominees.40 That year,
34

See
Ratings
for
Judicial
Nominees,
A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/federal_judiciary/resources/ratings_for_judicial_nomin
ees.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (link); Savage, supra note 8.
35
But see infra notes 36–45, 52–64 and accompanying text. Leahy sets hearings and votes, and
Reid, floor action. See sources cited supra note 19. In 2011, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) replaced
Sessions.
36
Press Release, Jeff Sessions U.S. Senator for Alabama, Senate Rejects Extreme Nominee (May
19,
2011),
available
at
http://sessions.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressShop.NewsReleases&ContentRecord_id=
09e6b685-9489-1554-c8fc-5bdb46cdf15d&Region_id=&Issue_id=ecaf7068-9f22-0909-73d6ca29cc5d2533 (link); see infra notes 52–57.
37
155 CONG. REC. S10,754 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2009) (link); Michael A. Fletcher, Obama Criticized
as
Too
Cautious,
Slow
on
Judicial
Posts,
WASH. POST,
Oct.
16,
2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/15/AR2009101504083.html
(link);
Doug
Kendall,
The
Bench
in
Purgatory,
SLATE,
Oct.
26,
2009,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/10/the_bench_in_purgatory.html
(link).
38
155 CONG. REC., supra note 37 (discussing Chen); Chen, supra note 5. For statements regarding
Martinez, see U.S. Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, Webcast of Executive Business Meeting (Apr. 15,
2010),
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/resources/webcasts/index.cfm?changedate=04-11-10&p=all
(link); 156 CONG. REC. S10,868 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2010) (statement of Sen. Sessions) (link).
39
U.S. Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, Webcast of Executive Business Meeting (Oct. 15, 2009). The
GOP tactic is to “delay and conquer”: if Democrats “get out aggressively pushing back[,] . . . they can
create a perception that we’re delaying a lot of nominees, and [so] it will be harder for us to delay.” Dan
Friedman, Nomination Battle Begins Affecting Unopposed Judges, NAT’L J. DAILY, Oct. 28, 2009,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/member/daily/nominations-battle-begins-affecting-unopposed-judges20091028?mrefid=site_search (link).
40
Justice Sotomayor was confirmed in August 2009. Alex Leary, Supreme Court Seat Not Only One
Empty, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009; see Tobias, supra note 6, at 780, 782–83.
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McConnell agreed to few nominee Senate votes, and the GOP placed holds
on a number of consensus candidates. This conduct slowed review and
necessitated the Democrats’ cloture petitions.41 Meanwhile, Republicans
sought substantial debate time and roll call votes for nominees they
ultimately favored.42 Minorities and women—including Fourth Circuit
Judges Davis and Barbara Keenan—waited on ballots for protracted
periods, even though the court had numerous vacancies.43
The 2010 approval of Justice Elena Kagan stalled appointments for
lower courts, which explains in part why one appellate nominee had floor
consideration across a ninety-day timeframe, while members only
confirmed six 2010 appellate nominees between Kagan’s appointment and
the year’s conclusion, and merely nine throughout 2011.44 Openly gay
nominee Edward DuMont waited interminably for a hearing.45
Obama has made 181 nominations in all, with the Senate approving
136 of them, including 2 Supreme Court Justices, 26 circuit judges, and 105
trial judges.46
41
155 CONG. REC. S10,752 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2009) (statement of Sen. Sessions) (link); id. at
S11,421 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2009) (Judge David Hamilton cloture vote) (link); 156 CONG. REC. S908
(daily ed. Mar. 2, 2010) (Judge Barbara Keenan 99–0 cloture and merits votes) (link). Cloture gives
opponents 30 debate hours, devouring scarce time. Senate Rule XXII (2010), available at
http://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_index_subjects/Cloture_vrd.htm (link).
42
The GOP sought an hour for Martin and two hours for Roberto Lange but overwhelmingly
approved both in minutes. 155 CONG. REC. S10,601 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2009) (regarding Judge Lange)
(link); 156 CONG. REC., supra note 32 (regarding Judge Martin).
43
See supra notes 37, 41, infra note 45. But see 155 CONG. REC., supra note 41, at S10,753
(statement of Sen. Sessions) (link).
44
Paul Kane & Robert Barnes, Senate Confirms Elena Kagan’s Nomination to Supreme Court,
WASH.
POST,
Aug.
6,
2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/08/05/AR2010080505247.html?nav=emailpage (link); 157 CONG. REC. S8770
(daily ed. Dec. 17, 2011) (link); 156 CONG. REC. S6971 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2010) (link). Stranch and
Albert Diaz waited thirteen months, even with their GOP senators’ support. 156 CONG. REC. S7009
(daily ed. Sept. 13, 2010) (link); id. at S10,667 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2010) (link). The Senate confirmed
thirteen in 2010 and nine in 2011. 111th Congress—Judicial Nominations, supra note 25; 112th
Congress—Judicial Nominations, supra note 25. In late 2011, the Senate recessed without voting on
twenty-one nominees who had Judiciary Committee approval, and the GOP returned eight nominees to
Obama. 157 CONG. REC. S8772 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2011) (link).
45
Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama Nominates Edward C.
DuMont for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Apr. 14, 2010) (link); Letter
from Edward DuMont to President Barack Obama (Nov. 4, 2011) (on file with author) (link). A striking
2012 example of obstruction was the 89–5 cloture and 94–5 merits vote on Judge Adalberto José Jordán.
158 CONG. REC. S558 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2012) (link); id. at S673 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2012) (link).
46
The Judiciary Committee reported 34 circuit and 121 district picks. 111th Congress—Judicial
Nominations, supra note 25; 112th Congress—Judicial Nominations, supra note 25. More than half of
the Obama appellate and district nominees are presently sitting judges. AFJ SNAPSHOT, supra note 31, at
8. This elevation within the judiciary suggests a career judiciary. RUSSELL WHEELER, BROOKINGS INST.,
THE
FEDERAL
JUDICIARY’S
CHANGING
FACE
7–9
(2009),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/08_federal_judiciary_wheeler/08_federal_judic
iary_wheeler.pdf (link); Goldman et al., supra note 19, at 300.
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Obama’s diversity efforts have produced significant benefits. He has
surpassed prior administrations in swiftly nominating people of color,
women, and LGBT individuals. Persistent consultation with home-state
politicians has led to the nomination and confirmation of able candidates,
restricting somewhat the incessant divisions and paybacks that have
undermined the selection process.47 Most critically, additional cooperation
has directly facilitated appointments while improving citizen regard for the
process and court legitimacy.48
Obama’s strategy for expanding diversity provides numerous benefits,
especially for increasing judicial legitimacy. The numerous minority and
female candidates, many of whom possess superb qualifications and ABA
rankings, illustrate the arguments in favor of greater diversity—remedying
past discrimination and expanding representation, both substantive and
descriptive.49 The candidates correspondingly address opponents’ most
prominent concerns—the nominees are highly competent, are not
stigmatized upon reaching the bench, and undermine claims of reverse
discrimination.
Even though Obama’s initiatives have provided benefits, several
features warrant improvement. A core metric for measuring the efficacy of
judicial selection is the speed of confirmation. Slow appointments erode
legitimacy by leaving many judgeships empty and delaying access to
justice. For example, in 2009, only a dozen picks—including seven
individuals of color and five women—secured confirmation. The next year,
merely twenty people of color and twenty-five women were appointed.50
Obama bears some responsibility for the delayed nominations. While
aggressively consulting lawmakers and minimizing divisiveness through
comprehensive pre-nomination evaluations were efficacious strategies,

47
Compare supra notes 23–24, 35–45 and accompanying text (discussing President Obama’s
consultation with party leaders during the judicial appointments process, which was still stalled at times
by the Senate), with Tobias, supra note 6, at 773–76 (“Bush’s nominal consultation with the Senate
delayed the expeditious appointment of his nominees, while the minimal review granted to nominees of
President Clinton triggered paybacks.”). See also supra note 41 (ten GOP senators favored cloture on
Hamilton as President’s nominees merit votes); supra note 43 (other examples of nominees who waited
on ballots for protracted periods).
48
See Tobias, supra note 6, at 779; Tobias, supra note 33, at 767–68.
49
Minority and female judges provide substantive representation by helping colleagues understand
and evaluate a range of controversial legal issues such as employment discrimination, civil rights,
immigration, and criminal law. Beiner, supra note 6, at 610–17; Chen, supra note 5; Tracey E. George,
Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 19–21 (2001); Madhavi McCall, Structuring Gender’s Impact:
Judicial Voting Across Criminal Justice Cases, 36 AM. POL. RES. 264 (2008) (link). But see Stephen
Choi et al., Judging Women, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 504 (2011) (link). This list is not exhaustive.
A bench that resembles the nation also remedies past discrimination and provides descriptive
representation, instilling public confidence. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench:
Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405 (2000) (link); supra notes 4–
5 and accompanying text.
50
No LGBT nominees won approval. Goldman, supra note 19.

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/6/

291

106: 283 (2012)

Justifying Diversity in Federal Judiciary

these activities imposed temporal costs.51
The GOP, on the other hand, bears more responsibility for the slow
confirmations. The party held over numerous minority and female nominee
committee ballots; actions apparently meant to stall for partisan gain.52
However, the Senate floor was the primary bottleneck. The Senate did not
vote on six appellate candidates the panel reported in 2009 and hardly
picked up the pace in the years following. McConnell and his GOP
colleagues effectively disregarded Reid’s importuning; numerous senators
placed holds on exceptional, uncontroversial nominees while seeking hours
for debate when only minutes were required.53 Democrats rarely pressed
Senate ballots or deployed cloture to force votes because this would have
ultimately proved counterproductive by infuriating Republicans and
exacerbating delay.54
Liu, whom the GOP found controversial, is Asian American.55 Sessions
organized a committee ballot against the nominee,56 and Liu waited fifteen
months for an up-or-down Senate vote that never materialized because
merely one Republican favored cloture.57 Another person of color, Judge
Diaz—who sparked absolutely no controversy, possessed an enviable
record, mustered a 2009 nomination in the Fourth Circuit, and secured a
unanimous January 2010 panel ballot—only garnered floor consideration

51
He did not always tap expeditiously or consult. Carl Tobias, Filling the Fourth Circuit Vacancies,
89 N.C. L. REV. 2161, 2190–91 (2011) (link). Senate use of panels to review and send names, assessing
and choosing picks, and negotiating took time. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
52
See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
53
McConnell agreed to few votes and none before Sotomayor’s. 111th Congress—Judicial
Nominations, supra note 25; 112th Congress—Judicial Nominations, supra note 25; supra note 40;
Goldman, et al., supra note 19; Tobias, supra note 19. Holds were traditionally rare. Nan Aron, GOP
Senators
Perfect
Art
of
Stalling,
POLITICO,
Feb.
2,
2010,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/32342.html (link); James Oliphant, Obama Losing Chance
to Reshape Judiciary, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/15/nation/la-naobama-judges15-2010mar15 (link). For debate time, see supra note 42.
54
See supra notes 36–45 and accompanying text.
55
Maura Dolan, Goodwin Liu Confirmed to California Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/01/local/la-me-0901-goodwin-liu-20110901 (link); Press Release,
supra note 36.
Liu and Chen are two of ten Asian American nominees, compared to only five percent of Latino
nominees considered to be controversial. Chen waited two years for approval. 157 CONG. REC. S2831–
32 (daily ed. May 10, 2011) (link); supra note 38.
56
Linda
Greenhouse,
Rock
Bottom,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
14,
2011,
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/rock-bottom/ (link); see supra text accompanying
notes 36, 39.
57
See 157 CONG. REC. S3146 (daily ed. May 19, 2011) (link); Press Release, supra note 36. D.C.
Circuit nominee Caitlin Halligan’s process was similar. 157 CONG. REC. S8346–47 (daily ed. Dec. 6,
2011) (link); Press Release, White House, Office of Press Sec’y, Statement by the President on
Republican Filibuster of Caitlin Halligan, Dec. 6, 2011 (link).
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that December.58
These partisan activities, which are essential to understanding
Scherer’s concerns regarding legitimacy, posed acute disadvantages. In
particular, they unnecessarily lengthened selection, damaged whatever
civility remained in the process, and propelled confirmation wars. The
behavior sent nominees into prolonged limbo, discouraged remarkable
prospective candidates, and denied courts crucial resources.59 These
phenomena, in turn, undermined public respect both for the judicial
selection process and for the government, with an especially strong negative
impact on court legitimacy.
The Senate approved a mere twenty-six people of color during
Obama’s initial half-term.60 Circuit appointments have consumed nine
months,61 and the confirmation rate of Obama’s nominees is the lowest
documented.62 Phenomena over which the President lacks complete power
that affect the nomination and confirmation process may partly explain his
record.63
58
See Jim Morrill, Diaz Confirmed to 4th Circuit, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 19, 2010,
http://www.ongo.com/v/158586/-1/062F4803065DEF23/diaz-confirmed-to-4th-circuit (link); See also
156 CONG. REC. S10,667 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2010) (link); supra note 44 and accompanying text.
59
It slows civil, and even criminal, cases. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Criminal Case Glut
Impedes
Civil
Suits,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Nov.
10,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204505304577001771159867642.html (link); Judicial
Emergency Declared in Arizona, THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 2011, at 3. (link). The Speedy Trial Act requires
that criminal cases receive precedence, but even these are now delayed by judicial vacancies. See
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–74 (2006) (link).
60
157 CONG. REC. S7899 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (link); ALLIANCE FOR
JUSTICE, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY: PRESIDENT OBAMA AND THE 111TH CONGRESS 22 (2011)
[hereinafter
STATE
OF
THE
JUDICIARY],
available
at
http://www.afj.org/judicialselection/state_of_the_judiciary_111th_congress_report.pdf (link). The Senate confirmed fewer jurists
during Obama’s first year than for any other Chief Executive during the last half century, although the
confirmation process has since improved. See 158 CONG. REC. S1711–12 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2012)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (link).
61
David
Fontana,
Going
Robe,
NEW
REPUBLIC,
Dec.
17,
2009,
http://www.tnr.com/article/environment-energy/going-robe (link); see 111th Congress—Judicial
Nominations, supra note 25; 112th Congress—Judicial Nominations, supra note 25.
62
Carol J. Williams, Legal Logjam Leaving Judges’ Seats Empty in Federal Courts, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/30/nation/la-na-judicial-logjam-20100831 (link).
But see 157 CONG. REC. S7898 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (link).
63
Naming Justices expeditiously was crucial but slowed other action. See supra notes 33, 44.
Obama met with “start-up” costs in instituting his appointed government. See Peter Baker, Obama Team
Lacking
Most
of
Top
Players,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
24,
2009,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0DE7DA103EF937A1575BC0A96F9C8B63&pagew
anted=all (link); Al Kamen, Here Come Judges? Maybe Not, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/looking-for-a-seat-on-the-federal-benchfuhgeddaboutit/2011/10/18/gIQAalHOvL_print.html (link). He faced fiscal and overseas dilemmas.
Peter Baker, Could Afghanistan Become Obama’s Vietnam?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/23/weekinreview/23baker.html?pagewanted=all
(link);
Charles
Krauthammer,
Op-Ed,
Who
Lost
Iraq?,
WASH.
POST,
Nov.
3,
2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/who-lost-iraq/2011/11/03/gIQAUcUqjM_story.html (link).
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In short, Obama nominated sixty-five persons of color, seventy-six
women, and four LGBT individuals—all of them very qualified—while the
Senate has confirmed only forty-nine people of color, sixty–one women and
three LGBT persons. Although the Senate has used dynamic procedures to
speed review, partisanship has slowed numerous appointments. This Essay
thus turns to promising new ideas that will facilitate the confirmation of
additional nominees and address Scherer’s diversity concerns.64
B. Measures for Improving the Process, Diversity, and Legitimacy
Obama has adopted goals for increasing diversity, implemented
effective practices to realize them,65 and set records for nominating talented
women and people of color early in his presidency,66 but he might realize
even greater success. His efforts have been responsive to Scherer’s
concerns about a diversification strategy because they have improved the
judiciary’s diversity, quality, and legitimacy. In general, Obama should
proceed cautiously as before, though he ought to consider the changes
suggested.67 For instance, the Administration might reassess the devices it
uses, better calibrate or jettison less productive endeavors, redouble certain
actions, canvass and deploy constructive solutions previously employed,
and perhaps rely on innovative efforts.68
While the White House has tapped numerous qualified minorities and
women, it has been less successful in confirming these judges to specific
appellate and district courts. Thus, Obama should urge prompt confirmation
of these nominees and propose more. If commissions or politicians suggest
too few qualified candidates,69 the Administration should urge them to
furnish more,70 particularly for nondiverse courts.71 Obama has submitted
64
Some notions have already received consideration. See, e.g., Goldman et al., supra note 19;
Tobias, supra note 12; infra note 91 and accompanying text.
65
Merit was the touchstone. He consulted officials and steadily nominated minority and female
candidates, several of whom GOP lawmakers favored. See supra notes 19–35 and accompanying text.
66
See supra notes 31, 47 and accompanying text.
67
Obama has not stated diversity goals in a national forum, which would increase transparency and
inform selection officers and citizens. Carl Tobias, Dear President Bush: Leaving a Legacy on the
Federal Bench, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1041, 1049 (2008) (link).
68
Courts, the source of many fine minority and female nominees, are instructive. Obama must keep
using them and related fruitful sources, such as civil and criminal bar association members and scholars.
69
Some senators referred one prospect. See, e.g., Alan Cooper, Webb, Warner Invoke McDonnell on
Keenan’s
Behalf,
VA.
LAWS.
WKLY.,
Feb.
25
2010,
http://valawyersweekly.com/vlwblog/2010/02/25/webb-warner-invoke-mcdonnell-onkeenan%E2%80%99s-behalf/ (link); Bishop, supra note 24 (discussing the appointment of a Fourth
Circuit judge); Ryan, supra note 24 (discussing the appointment of a Third Circuit judge).
70
See supra notes 19–29 and accompanying text. Predecessors asked senators to refer more persons
of color and women. Tobias, supra note 12, at 1199.
71
Critical sources include minority and women’s bar associations and political groups and officers;
they pursue, analyze, and promote fine picks. E.g., NAT’L ASIAN PAC. AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.napaba.org/napaba/showpage.asp?code=home (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (link); HISPANIC
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minority and female Republican confirmees and other nominees the party
favors, yet he could adjust this strategy by choosing additional GOP
appointees72 or candidates with party ties.73 Obama might even improve his
work by nominating such candidates more quickly, including those such as
Judge Jacqueline Nguyen, a 2009 Obama district court appointee.74 Past
presidents have implemented analogous strategies to great effect, from
Jimmy Carter adopting a Circuit Judge Nominating Commission to George
H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton asking legislators to forward more women.75
Obama should continue applying cooperative, nuanced policies, as
missteps may erode his credibility and stall confirmations. This is especially
true because Obama has made bipartisanship the cornerstone of his
presidency. If this approach—including robust consultation and a
meritocratic selection process—lacks efficacy because the GOP neglects to
cooperate, he may assess less conciliatory avenues. Should the GOP keep
slowing nominee floor action, Obama could invoke the bully pulpit to
embarrass and criticize the party, make the unfilled seats an election issue,
nominate candidates for all eighty-one current vacant posts, or make recess
appointments.76
Obama ought to carefully articulate how diversifying the courts
addresses the views of both champions and critics and helps the country,
though he may find that the record numbers of female and minority
nominees speak for themselves.77 For example, recent Asian American
NAT’L BAR ASS’N, http://www.hnba.com/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (link); see supra notes 19–24 and
accompanying text.
72
For instance, Bush appointed twenty-six Latino district judges. Goldman, supra note 31, at 5.
73
Full communication before and after the nominations consolidates efforts. Tobias, supra note 6, at
785.
74
Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama Nominates Judge
Jacqueline H. Nguyen to Serve on the United States Court of Appeals (Sept. 22, 2011) (link). Elevation
is a venerated tool. See supra note 30. While the President should nominate more quickly, he must still
fully consult. See 157 CONG. REC. S7898, supra note 62.
75
Tobias supra note 67, at 1052–53; see supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text.
76
See David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Navigating the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 102
NW. U. L. REV. 1869, 1902–06 (2008) (book review) (link); Tobias, supra note 33, at 772. All dramatize
how the large number of judicial openings delays justice. Since 1980, four judges were recess
appointments. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (link); Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir.
2004) (link); William Ty Mayton, Recess Appointments and an Independent Judiciary, 20 CONST.
COMMENT. 515 (2004) (link). Obama’s recent Executive Branch recess appointments inflamed many
GOP senators, but it remains unclear whether this will affect judicial selection. Charlie Savage, Obama
Tempts
Fight
Over
Recess
Appointments,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
4,
2012,
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/obama-tempts-fight-over-recessappointments/?ref=recessappointments (link); Jonathan Weisman, Republican Vow of Revenge Falls
Short, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/senate-g-o-p-vowedto-oppose-all-obama-choices-but-nominee-gets-bipartisan-confirmation/ (link).
77
See supra notes 31, 47 and accompanying text. Justice Sotomayor was the major exception to his
rare articulation of rationales for his choices vis-à-vis diversification. Obama praised her for
surmounting barriers that “can give a person . . . a sense of compassion; an understanding of how . . .
ordinary people live.” Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President
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confirmees and Fourth Circuit minority and female appointees are helping
to rectify prior discrimination and improve representation, especially
descriptive and perhaps substantive. Their consummate abilities
correspondingly allay concerns regarding stigmatization, dilution of
qualifications, and reverse discrimination.78 Both parties instituted effective
concepts for increasing diversity and should continue implementing them to
fill vacancies.79 Politicians may reinstate a few traditions—namely
conducting expeditious Senate ballots for qualified, uncontroversial triallevel candidates—while exercising more deference to home-state
colleagues and President Obama, who has rigorously consulted lawmakers,
indulged their preferences, and even nominated some individuals suggested
by Republicans.80
Despite the use of these procedures, the Senate was the bottleneck for
confirming numerous minorities and women.81 The GOP ought to cease
stymieing nominees and cooperate.82 Committee analysis has minimally
slowed confirmation,83 yet GOP members should quit regularly holding
over votes seven days absent clear justification.84 Venerable practices and

in Nominating Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the United States Supreme Court (May 26, 2009) (link); supra
note 33. His successors should follow these ideas.
78
The number of Asian Americans nominated by Obama that the Senate confirmed equals the
number of sitting Asian American judges at Obama’s election. See AJF SNAPSHOT, supra note 31, at 6;
STATE OF THE JUDICIARY, supra note 60, at 22; Tricia Bishop, Conservative Federal Appeals Court
Shifts Left, BALT. SUN, Nov. 19, 2011, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-11-19/news/bs-md-fourthcircuit-20111119_1_federal-appeals-ilya-shapiro-4th-circuit (link); supra text accompanying notes 36–
37, 41, 44, 55. The President and researchers could also collect and scrutinize more data related to other
benefits that a diversity program can supply and clearly enunciate these advantages.
79
One concept is panels that aid, but slow, the approval process. Officials may refine them, if
needed, vis-à-vis earlier panels. See supra notes 23–24. For cooperation with Obama, see supra notes
24–29; supra text accompanying notes 32–35, 46. Issues did arise, so senators may reassess and adjust
ideas used, analyze prior ideas, and canvass new ones. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
80
See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S8770–72 (daily ed. Dec 17, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (link);
Kendall, supra note 37; supra text accompanying notes 23–24, 32–33; Scott Wong, Bob Menendez
Denies
Judge
Block
Reports,
POLITICO,
Jan.
6,
2012,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71159.html (link).
81
Republicans should remember that when they held the Executive, Democrats confirmed more
judges, and citizens may blame them for vacancy problems. See Tobias, supra note 33, at 756. But see
Orrin G. Hatch, The Constitution as the Playbook for Judicial Selection, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
1035, 1037–39 (2009) (link).
82
Members should proffer helpful guidance when consulted and suggest other candidates when
Obama’s are unacceptable, while swiftly approving qualified, uncontroversial nominees.
83
If this occurs, approval may be accelerated by shorter review of able, consensus nominees. Helen
Dewar, Republicans Push Speedy Action on Court Picks, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2003, at A7; see Tobias,
supra note 33, at 766, 774.
84
One example was holding over nominees so a newly elected senator could assess them. See U.S.
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, Webcast of Exec. Business Meeting (Feb. 3, 2011),
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735da166247a (link).
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customs suggest nominees warrant hearings and ballots,85 and the paucity of
floor consideration best explains the dearth of appointments.86 Republicans
must sharply curtail routine use of holds to stall votes, in particular for
talented, uncontroversial minority and female district court nominees.
McConnell could also halt or restrict uncooperative actions, including
eschewing time agreements, which slow approval while provoking cloture.
If the GOP actively keeps applying filibuster equivalents through holds,
Democrats may reinstitute some ideas, essentially those of the “Gang of
14,” which limit this conduct by adopting compromises acceptable to
centrist politicians. Democrats may also offer more drastic reforms, as
Congress did in abandoning anonymous holds, or capitalize on some of the
aggressive tactics recounted above.87
In the end, senators ought to carefully balance the need for thorough
investigation of judicial prospects against the need to fill vacancies
promptly and confirm skilled female and minority nominees. The parties
must reduce their emphasis on ideology, as Obama has cautiously done.88
Article II contemplates that senators will consider ability, character, and
temperament,89 but they should not inquire into how nominees would
resolve cases because doing so could erode judicial independence.90 One
85

See 156 CONG. REC. S5836 (daily ed. July 14, 2010) (statement of Sen. McConnell) (link);
Michael J. Gerhardt, Merit vs. Ideology, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 353 (2005) (link); Tobias, supra note 33,
at 764, 774.
86
Reid must set floor votes faster after panel approvals and set more debates for controversial
nominees. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S2515–38 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (showing debate among
senators on the confirmation of Judge Merrick Garland) (link); 155 CONG. REC. S11,411–21 (daily ed.
Nov. 17, 2009) (showing the debate regarding Judge David Hamilton’s confirmation) (link).
87
See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S296–305 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2011) (abandoning anonymous holds)
(link); MICHAEL GERHARDT & RICHARD PAINTER, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, “EXTRAORDINARY
CIRCUMSTANCES”: THE LEGACY OF THE GANG OF 14 AND A PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS
REFORM (2011) (discussing Gang of 14 ideas and anonymous holds) (link); Text of Senate Compromise
on
Nominations
of
Judges,
N.Y.
TIMES,
May
24,
2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/24/politics/24text.html (discussing how Gang of 14 ideas related to
“pending and future judicial nominations”) (link); supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing
assertive ideas). But see supra note 57 and accompanying text (showing how “extraordinary
circumstances” may lack meaning because Liu and Halligan received only one GOP vote each for
cloture).
88
Serving groups or writing opinions or articles that members oppose must not drive the approval
process. The overemphasis on ideology is as futile as attempting to detect whether nominees would be
“judicial activists.” See STEFANIE LINDQUIST & FRANK CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (2009);
The Judicial Nomination and Confirmation Process: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Oversight & the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 4–8, 262–64 (2001) (statements
of Sen. Sessions & Prof. John McGinnis) [hereinafter Hearings].
89
Hearings, supra note 88; Douglas Laycock, Forging Ideological Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
18, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/18/opinion/forging-ideological-compromise.html (link).
90
See THOMAS O. SARGENTICH ET AL., CITIZENS FOR INDEP. CTS., UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS
AND AMERICA’S COURTS 1–75, 121–205 (2000) (link); Symposium, Judicial Independence and
Accountability, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315 (1999). The ideas aptly apply to Chen, Davis, Liu and Martinez,
who received vigorous criticism that unfairly denigrated their records. E.g., sources cited supra notes
36–39, 55–58.
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efficacious solution for all of these concerns may be the presumption that
able, uncontroversial nominees—including individuals of color and
women—secure floor votes.91
CONCLUSION
Professor Scherer broadens our understanding of appointments,
especially with regard to ideas for increasing court diversity and legitimacy.
Yet her valuable article only nominally reviews the ways that sheer
partisanship skews efforts to confirm minority and female candidates.
President Obama’s special initiatives to enhance diversity are illustrative.
The Chief Executive appointed numerous talented people of color and
women, but political gamesmanship caused the selection process to
function more slowly than it should have. He must now confirm additional
competent minority and female nominees and carefully articulate
convincing rationales to improve diversity. Legislators should be receptive
to the White House’s efforts and cooperate with Obama and congressional
colleagues. If each party directly applies these recommendations, the
federal court system could benefit from enhanced diversity and legitimacy.

91
For example, ten GOP senators favored cloture on Hamilton, even though nine voted against him
on the merits. See supra note 41 (cloture vote); 155 CONG. REC. S11, 544, 11, 552 (daily ed. Nov. 19,
2009) (merits vote). For ideas that Obama and senators may use, see Goldman et al., supra note 19;
Tuan Samahon, The Judicial Vesting Option: Opting Out of Nomination and Advice and Consent, 67
OHIO ST. L.J. 783 (2006); Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47
EMORY L.J. 527, 552–73 (1998). The presidential election in 2012 will slow selection even further.
Goldman et al., supra note 19; Al Kamen, Judicial Nominees: Beware the Thurmond Rule, WASH. POST,
Feb. 3, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/post/judicial-nominees-beware-thethurmond-rule/2012/01/31/gIQAV4fFlQ_blog.html (link); see also JOHN G. ROBERTS, 2010 YEAR-END
REPORT
ON
THE
FEDERAL
JUDICIARY
7–8
(2010),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2010year-endreport.pdf (link); Greenhouse, supra
note 56; George Packer, The Empty Chamber, NEW YORKER, Aug. 9, 2010,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/08/09/100809fa_fact_packer (link).
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